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DRED SCOTT'S CASE - RECONSIDERED
WALLACE MENDELSON*
The Dred Scott decision" is not, as our folklore would have it, the
classically worst, or even a typical, assertion of judicial supremacy.
To be sure, earlier abolitionist-inspired interpretations have given
way to a rather general acceptance of it as a "sincere" judicial effort
to solve a nation-wrecking problem.2 But even this latter view
obscures the fact that the most criticized decision in American juris-
prudence was undertaken only upon explicit invitation of Congress
and did no more than give constitutional sanction to a position
held long and persistently by most contemporary voters. This view
-the present thesis-obviates an otherwise tantalizing paradox:
that Chief Justice Taney should suddenly in 1857 abandon that
Jacksonian respect for popular sovereignty and the democratic
processes which for twenty years had been the hallmark of his
philosophy upon the bench.3
Acquisition of the Mexican and Oregon territories during the
administration of President Polk (1845-1849) revived the old
problem of the extension of slavery-the problem which in the case
of the Louisiana Purchase had been settled by the Missouri Com-
promise of 1820. After full discussion, President Polk and the
members of his Cabinet unanimously agreed tha tthe principle of the
old compromise should be adapted to current needs.4 That is, the
360 30' parallel should be recognized as the boundary between free,
dom and slavery from the Louisiana territory to the Pacific. But
that simple solution was no longer acceptable in the North. The
Wilmot Proviso, supported by resolutions of all but one of the
Northern state legislatures, would have prohibited by act of Con-
gress the introduction of slavery into any of the newly acquired
domain.5 After its adoption by the House of Representatives in
February, 1847, Southern leaders abandoned their willingness to
compromise on the old Missouri basis and took the line that Con-
*Professor of Political Science, University of Tennessee.
1. Scott v. Sandford, 19 How. 393 (U.S. 1857), holding the Missouri
Compromise unconstitutional on the ground, inter alia, that the Fifth Amend-
ment prohibited Congress from interfering with slavery in the territories.
2. See, for example, Charles Evans Hughes, Roger Brooke Taney. 17
A. B. A. J. 785, 787 (1931).
3. See Mendelson, Chief Justice Taney-acksonian Judge, 12 U. of
Pitt. L. Rev. 381 (1951).
4. The Diary of James K. Polk, entries for Jan. 5, 16, 1847 (Quaife ed.
1910).
5. 1 Morrison and Commager, The Growth of the American Republic
598 (1942).
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gress had no power to proscribe slavery anywhere. 6 Thus in typical
American fashion a vexing problem of social policy was translated
into constitutional jargon and became a "legal question." Sup-
porters of Wilmot's Proviso, of course, assumed Congressional
power to outlaw slavery in the territories, while the Northern
ultras held that the Constitution itself prohibited slavery in the terri-
tories. Southerners found constitutional denial of national power to
interfere with their peculiar proprietary interests.7 Upon the issue
so joined Congress was unable to make a decision, for while the
Northern view prevailed in the House, it was blocked in the
Senate. Accordingly settlers in the new territory had to do without
government because Congress could not decide whether they must
do without slaves."
This impasse is the background of the attempted Clayton Com-
promise9 of mid-1848 whereby Congress in organizing the California
and New Mexico territories was to remain silent on the subject of
slavery, leaving its introduction or prohibition to rest
"... on the Constitution, as the same should be expounded by
the [territorial] judges, with a right to appeal to the Supreme
Court of the United States."' 0
In this manner, according to Senator Clayton of Maine, Congress
would "avoid the decision of this distracting question, leaving it
to be settled by the silent operation of the Constitution itself .... 1
After elaborate debate the Clayton Compromise was passed in the
Senate and defeated in the House (the latter still intent upon the
Wilmot Proviso). But the essence of Clayton's proposal lived on
to be incorporated in the great Compromise of 185012 and the
Kansas-Nebraska Act of 1854'3 and to reach fruition in the Dred
Scott decision.
In January, 1850, Henry Clay of Kentucky introduced in the
Senate the famous resolutions which were the foundation of the
Compromise of 1850. His second resolution, recognizing the in-
6. Id. at 599-600; McLaughlin, A Constitutional History of the United
States 512-513 (1936).
7. For a review of the opposing constitutional theories, see id. at 514
et seq.
8. 1 Morrison and Commager, op. cit. supra note 5, at 599.
9. Cong. Globe, 30th Cong., 1st Sess. 950, 1002 (1848).
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid.
12. Embodied in four separate measures as follows: The Texas and New
Mexico Act, 9 Stat. 446 (1850) ; The Utah Act, 9 Stat. 453 (1850) ; The
Fugitive Slave Act, 9 Stat. 462 (1850); Act Abolishing the Slave Trade
in the District of Columbia, 9 Stat. 467 (1850).
13. 10 Stat. 277 (1854).
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compatibility of the Northern and Southern views as to the power of
Congress, proposed that
".. . it is inexpedient for Congress to provide by law either
for its [slavery's] introduction into, or exclusion from, any part
of the said territory; and that appropriate territorial govern-
ments ought to be established by Congress in all of the said
territory ... without the adoption of any restriction or condition
on the subject of slavery." 14
This was the doctrine of Congressioal non-intervention with
slavery in the territories which Lewis Cass, presidential candidate
of the Democratic Party, had sponsored in his famous Nicholson
Letter 5 of December, 1847-and which Stephen Douglas was later
to adopt and make famous under the banner of "popular [read
territorial] sovereignty." But it was perfectly clear that Congres-
sional silence would leave uncertain the legal status of slavery in
the new domain. To obviate this, amendments to Clay's non-inter-
vention provisions (in the bills embodying his resolutions) were
offered by both Northern and Southern ultras to embody their
respective constitutional views. Thus, for example, Senator Baldwin
of Connecticut, offering one such amendment, observed:
"I agree entirely in the sentiment which was advanced the other
day by the Senator from Louisiana [Mr. Soule] that we ought
not to pass a law which shall be understood in a different sense
by those who cooperate in its passage.... The people demand
a law, a rule for their conduct clear and intelligible. They do
not ask us to give them a Delphic response, which may be in-
terpreted in one way or another, according to the wishes of
every inquirer .... The object of my amendment is simply to
declare what we mean."'16
But Senator Clay knew the futility of such "clarifying" amend-
ments. It was in exactly those rapids that settlement of the terri-
torial problem had been floundering since 1846. Congressional
avoidance of the disputed issue and reference of it, as a constitutional
question, to the judiciary, was precisely the essence of his compro-
mise. As Clay put it, in answer to Baldwin:
"The bill leaves in full force the paramount authority of the
Constitution.... Now what ought to be done more satisfactory
to both sides of the question, to the free States and to the slave-
holding States, than to apply the principle of [Congressional]
non-intervention to the state of the law in New Mexico, and to
14. Sen. J., 31st Cong., 1st Sess. 118 (1850) ; Cong. Globe, 31st Cong.,
1st Sess. 245 (1850).
15. McLaughlin, op. cit. supra note 6, at 512-513.
16. Cong. Globe, 31st Cong., 1st Sess. 1146 (1850).
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leave the question of slavery or no slavery to be decided by the
only competent authority that can definitely settle it forever,
the authority of the Supreme Court of the United States.
"The honorable Senator from Connecticut [Mr. Baldwin]
on yesterday wanted the law settled. Suppe, then, we were to
make a declaration of the law pleasing to the learned Senator...
how if we were to attempt to settle this question could it be
settled? In the first place we can not settle it, because of the
great diversity of opinion which exists; and yet the Senator will
ask those who differ with him in opinion to surrender their
opinion, and, after they have made this sacrifice of opinion,
can they declare what the law is? When the question comes up
before the Supreme Court of the United States, that tribunal
will declare what the law is.17
On this basis the slavery extension aspects of the Compromise
of 1850 were settled. Congress simply delegated to the territorial
legislatures of Utah and New Mexico all power over slavery which
Congress itself might have, the extent of that power being the
subject of vigorous dispute:
". .. the legislative power of the territory shall extend to all
rightful subjects of legislation consistent with the Constitution
of the United States [with certain exceptions not here rele-
vant]."'"
Then to facilitate settlement of the constitutional question,
special liberalizing provisions were made in regard to federal
court jurisdiction in slavery litigation. Thus after providing that
"writs of error and appeals [to the Supreme Court of the United
States] from the final decisions of said [territorial] supreme court
shall be allowed, and may be taken in the same manner and under
the same regulations as from the circuit courts of the United States,
where the value of the property or amount in controversy ... shall
exceed one thousand dollars... ," special exception was made "in
all cases involving title to slaves" where it was provided, "the said
writs of error or appeals shall be allowed... without regard to the
value of the matter, property, or title in controversy. . . ." Similarly
"a writ of error or appeal shall be allowed to the Supreme Court of
the United States... upon any writ of habeas corpus involving the
question of personal freedom. .. ."
17. Id. at 1155. See the following for typical expressions of willingness
to accept judicial settlement of the slavery extension problem: Yulee of
Florida, Cong. Globe, 31st Cong., 1st Sess., appendix, 95-96 (1850) ; Phelps
of Vermont, id. at 95; Clay of Kentucky, id. at 916; Davis of Mississippi, id.
at 154; Turney of Tennessee, id. at 297.
18. The Texas and New Mexico Act, 9 Stat. 446 (1850); The Utah
Act, 9 Stat. 453 (1850).
19. Ibid.
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These provisions are a verbatim copy of parts of the Clayton
Compromise which had been added to Senator Clayton's original bill
after Senators Hamlin and Corwin had raised the point that the nor-
mal federal jurisdictional amount of one thousand dollars would pre-
vent effective operation of Clayton's proposal to shunt the slavery ex-
tension issue over to the courts.2 0 It is, of course, significant that
both provisions liberalizing the right of appeal to the Supreme Court
(that relating to habeas corpus as well as the eliminating the "juris-
dictional amount") were new in federal law. Senator Corwin's
comment on the scheme is apposite-Congress had enacted a law
suit, not a law.
21
This interpretation was adopted by Senator Stephen A. Douglas'
Committee on Territories which reported out on January 4, 1854,
the Dodge Bill for the organization of the Nebraska Territory:
"In the judgment of your committee, those measures [the acts
constituting the Compromise of 1850] were intended to have a
far more comprehensive and enduring effect than the mere ad-
justment of the difficulties arising out of the recent acquisition
of Mexican territory. They were designed to establish certain
great principles, which would... in all time to come, avoid the
perils of a similar agitation, by withdrawing the question of
slavery from the halls of Congress and the political arena, and
committing it to the arbitrament of those who were immediately
interested in, and alone responsible for its consequences. [There
follows recital of some of the arguments as to the constitutional-
ity of slavery in the territories and of the power of Congress with
respect to slavery.] Your committee do not feel themselves called
upon to enter into the discussion of these controverted questions.
They involve the same grave issues which produced the agitation,
the sectional strife, and the fearful struggle of 1850. As Congress
deemed it wise and prudent to refrain from deciding the matters
in controversy then ... by any act declartory of the true intent
of the Constitution... so your committee are not now prepared
to recommend a departure from the course pursued on that
memorable occasion.., by any act declaratory of the meaning of
the Constitution in respect to the legal points in dispute ... it
it apparent that the compromise measures of 1850 affirm and
rest upon the following propositions-First: That all questions
pertaining to slavery in the territories, and in the new States to
be formed therefrom, are to be left to the decision of the people
residing therein....
20. Cong. Globe, 30th Cong., 1st Sess. 988, 989, 1002-1005 (1848).
Senator Johnson of Maryland introduced the amendment (p. 1002). It will
be noted that his amendment is erroneously reported to read "title to lands"
instead of "title to slaves." The matter is corrected in sections 24 and 31
of the Bill as passed by the Senate (pp. 1004, 1005).
21. McLaughlin, op. cit. supra note 6, at 514.
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"Second: That all cases involving title to slaves, and "ques-
tions of personal freedom" are referred to the adjudication of
the local tribunals, with the right of appeal to the Supreme Court
of the United States. - -
The resulting legislation was the fateful Kansas-Nebraska Act
of 1854.23 In course of the Congressional debates on this Act,
the familiar arguments were made in favor of the familiar "clari-
fying" amendments. This time we know on the authority of Senator
Judah K. Benjamin of Louisiana, the problem was settled in caucus
where:
"Morning after morning we met for the purpose of coming to
some understanding upon that very point [slavery in the terri-
tories] ; and it was finally understood by all, agreed to by all,
made the basis of compromise by all the supporters of that bill,
that the territories should be organized with a delegation by Con-
gress of all the power of Congress in the Territories, and that
the extent of the power of Congress should be determined by the
Courts.
24
In the course of debate on the Kansas-Nebraska Bill, Senator
Brown gives what Allen Johnson calls the Southern viewpoint:
"If I thought that, in voting for the bill as it now stands, I was
conceding the right of the people in the territory, during their
territorial existence, to exclude slavery, I would withhold my
vote. . . . It [the bill] leaves the question where I am quite
willing it should be left-to the ultimate decision of the courts.
It is purely a judicial question, and if Congress well refrain from
intimating an opinion, I am willing that the Supreme Court shall
decide it. But, Sir, I have too often seen that Court sustaining
the intentions of Congress, to risk a decision in my favor, after
Congress has decided against me. The alien and sedition laws,
the blank law, the tariff law have all been decided constitutional.
Any why? Not, in my opinion, because they were so, but because
the Supreme Court, as a coordinate Department of Government,
was disinclined to clash with the other Departments. If this
question is allowed to go before the Supreme Court, free from
the influence of a Congressional pre-judgment, I will abide the
result though it be against me." 25
22. Sen. Rep. No. 15, 33d Cong.. 1st Sess. (1854).
23. 10 Stat. 277 (1854).
24. Cong. Globe, 36th Cong., 1st Sess. 1966 (1860). Senator Benjamin
said the same thing in greater detail prior to the Dred Scott decision. Cong.
Globe, 34th Cong., 1st Sess. 1093 (1856). For corroboration by Douglas and
Hunter, sue Cong. Globe, 35th Cong., 2d Sess. 1258 (1859) ; 33d Cong., 1st
Sess., appendix, 224 (1854). See also letter of Congressman A. H. Stephens,
May 9, 1860. in Cong. Globe, 36th Cong., 1st Sess., appendix, 315-316 (1860).
As to the "clarifying" amendments see, for example, the efforts of Senator
Chase, Cong. Globe, 33d Cong., 1st Sess. 421-423 (1854).
25. Cong. Globe, 33d Cong., 1st Sess., appendix, 232 (1854); Johnson,
Stephen A. Douglas 247 (1908).
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These remarks by Senator Brown may not be crucial in them-
selves, though Brown was one of the congressional leaders of his
day. But they become highly significant through endorsement by
the Chairman of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Mr. Butler,
vho joined in and then supplemented Brown's remarks as follows:
"I am willing ... to trust judges upon the bench who are sworn
to administer the law and observe the Constitution. I am there-
fore perfectly willing to trust this bill to fortune under the im-
pulse of justice."26
Accordingly what the Douglas Committee on Territories called
the "great principles" of the Compromise of 1850 were embodied
in the Kansas-Nebraska Act. After declaring the Missouri Com-
promise "inoperative and void" the measure in Section 14 provided
that:
"[It is] the true intent and meaning of this act not to legislate
slavery into any territory or State, nor to exclude it therefrom,
but to leave the people thereof perfectly free to form and regulate
their domestic institutions in their own way, subject only to the
Constitution of the United States .... [italics added]."27
The second great principle of the 1850 settlement relating to
appeals to the Supreme Court on slavery questions was reproduced
verbatim in the Kansas-Nebraska Act's Section 9.
Two years later, in July, 1856, only eight months prior to the
Dred Scott decision, Senator Lyman Trumbull of Illinois, in the
course of a debate on the admission of Kansas as a state, offered
what was probably the last "clarifying" amendment. Trumbull
wanted the above quoted "true intent and meaning" clause of the
Kansas-Nebraska Act glossed with the assertion that the latter
.. .was intended to, and does confer, upon, or leave to the
people of the Territory of Kansas full power at any time, through
its Territorial Legislature, to exclude slavery from said Terri-
tory, or to recognize and regulate it therein.
' ' 28
This, of course, was simply the Northern view, repudiated by
the South, that Congress and hence by derivation the Territories,
had power under the Constitution to regulate territorial slavery.
Senator Cass of Michigan answered Trumbull in the following
terms:
"It is said there is a difference of construction between the North
and the South on the Kansas-Nebraska Act.... The difference
does not result from the words of that bill, but from the nature
26. Id. at 240.
27. 10 Stat. 227 (1854).
28. Cong. Globe, 34th Cong., 1st Sess., appendix, 796 (1856).
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of things. The North and the South construe the Constitution
differently.... The different constructions of... [the Kansas-
Nebraska Act] result from no equivocations of it, but from the
fact that here is an important constitutional question undeter-
mined by the supreme judicial authority; and in the meantime
individuals in different sections of the Union put their own
constructions on it .... There is no power which the Senator
from Illinois can use-no words which he can put into an Act
of Congress, that will remove this constitutional doubt until it is
finally settled by the proper tribunal." 29
Senator Douglas whose genius got the Compromise of 1850 and
the Kansas-Nebraska Act through Congress, suspecting that his
colleague from Illinois was attempting to get commitments that
would destroy Douglas at home, answered Trumbull as follows:
"My opinion [on slavery in the territories] . . . has been well
known in the Senate for years .... I told them [in the Kansas-
Nebraska debates] it was a judicial question .... My answer
then was and now is, that if the Constitution carries slavery
there [into the territories] let it go ... but, if the Constitution
does not carry it there, no power but the people can carry it there.
... I stated I would not discuss this legal question, for by the
bill we referred it to the Courts.
30
Thereupon the Trumbull amendment was voted down.
XXas reference of the slavery extension issue to the judiciary
understood and acceptable outside of Congress? One month after the
Trumbull amendment debate, and some seven months before the
Dred Scott decision, which he was to condemn so bitterly, Abraham
Lincoln said in a public speech at Galena, Illinois:
"Do you [Democrats] say that such restrictions of slavery [in
the territories] would be unconstitutional and that some of the
States would not submit to its enforcement? I grant you that an
unconstitutional act is not a law; but I do not ask, and will not
take your construction of the Constitution. The Supreme Court
of the United States is the tribunal to decide such questions, and
we [Republicans] will submit to its decisions ... "31
There had been some doubt as to whether President Pierce
would sign the Kansas-Nebraska Act for he had been suspected of
free-soilism. To resolve any such doubts Secretary of War Jefferson
Davis arranged a conference between the President and a number
of leading Senators and Congressmen where administration support
29. Id. at 797-798.
30. Id. at 797.
31. Speech at Galena, Illinois, July 26, 1856, II Collected Works of
Abraham Lincoln 354-355 (Basler ed. 1953).
1953]
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for the measure was secured.3 2 Indeed as it turned out the Presi-
dent personally believed the Missouri Compromise unconstitutional,
but rather than repeal by the Kansas-Nebraska Act he favored a
"guarantee of rights of persons and property in accordance with the
Constitution, and would leave it to the Supreme Court to decide
what those rights were."33 In his last message to Congress on
December 22, 1856, President Pierce in effect endorsed the Dred
Scott decision in advance:
"All that the repeal [of the Missouri Compromise by the Kan-
sas-Nebraska Act] did was to relieve the statute book of an
objectionable enactment, unconstitutional in effect and injurious
in terms to a large portion of the states.
'3 4
Pierce had nothing but the highest praise for the Kansas-Ne-
braska Act. In a historical review of the slavery controversy he
condemned the Missouri settlement as conducive to sectional strife
and attributed Buchanan's victory in the presidential election of
the preceeding month to the desire of the people to have a termina-
tion of that difficulty. 35
In his inaugural address two days before the Dred Scott decision
President-elect Buchanan, referring to the problem of slavery in
the territories, said:
"[Ilt is a judicial question, which legitimately belongs to the
Supreme Court of the United States before whom it is now pend-
ing, and will, it is understood, be speedily and finally settled.
... The whole Territorial question being thus settled upon the
principle of popular sovereignty-a principle as ancient as
free government itself-everything of a practical nature has
been decided."3 6
Clearly the treatment of slavery in the territories as a judicial
question by important political figures on such occasions indicates a
rather general public acceptance of that mode of settlement. Similarly
in his first public mention of the matter after the Dred Scott decision
Douglas explained that by the Kansas-Nebraska Act Congressional
32. Simms, A Decade of Sectional Controversy 59-60 (1942).
33. Ibid.
34. 5 Richardson, A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the
Presidents 403 (1903).
35. Ibid.
36. Id. at 431. These remarks are famous in connection with evidence
now available which indicates that Buchanan had advance notice of what the
Dred Scott decision was to be. On this aspect of the matter see Swisher,
Roger B. Taney, c. 24 (1935). Whether he had advance notice or not, the
thoughts expressed in that public utterance make it quite plain that on the
eve of the Dred Scott decision there was nothing unusual in the proposition




power over slavery in the territories had been referred to the Su-
preme Court.37 The latter having spoken, it was the duty of all
good citizens to accept the decision. Indeed, Douglas praised the
Court for having passed over mere technicalities and turned its
decision upon the true merits of the issue."
We must now go back to trace the history of Dred Scott's
litigation." Having lost a decision in the Supreme Court of
Missouri,-0 Scott in late 1853 began a new action in trespass in
the federal court at St. Louis against a resident of New York who
claimed to be his master. Admitting that he had been a slave, the
plaintiff claimed that when he was taken into territory made free
by the Missouri Compromise he became free; that he had since
acquired Missouri citizenship and was thus properly in a federal
court on diversity grounds. Scott won on a plea in abatement which
questioned his citizenship, but lost on the merits.4' The case was
argued on appeal in the Supreme Court of the United States in
February, 1856.42 At that time Mr. Greeley's New York Tribune
reported that the case would probably be decided against Scott on
"the pretext" that his voluntary return from free to slave territory
(i.e., the state of Missouri) restored his status as a slave; that
the Supreme Court would thus "evade" the real issue (i.e., the
constitutionality of the Missouri Compromise), but that "an effort
will be made to get a positive decree of some sort .... ,,43 In April
Justice Curtis wrote to a friend that the Court would "not decide
the question of the Missouri Compromise line-a majority of the
37. Speech to the Grand Jury, Springfield, Illinois, June 12, 1857. See
Milton, The Eve of Conflict 260 (1934). It will be noted, of course, that
it was Douglas who won the Lincoln-Douglas debates, in the sense that it
was he who won the prize at stake, a seat in the United States Senate. In
that campaign the meaning and implications of the Dred Scott case were
thoroughly canvassed by its leading critic and its leading apologist.
Of course the Dred Scott case did not arrive at the Supreme Court via
the procedural (i.e., jurisdiction-liberalizing) route provided in either the
Compromise of 1850 or the Kansas-Nebraska Act, but, as Douglas recognized
in the Grand Jury Speech, it did dispose of the substantive issue contemplated
by that legislation. Lincoln's recognition of the latter point is implicit in his
"House-divided" speech (Springfield, Illinois, June 17, 1858) where he sees
a conspiracy between "Stephen [Douglas), Franklin [Pierce]. Roger [Taney],
and James [Buchanan]"--the main elements of their "plot" being the language
of the Kansas-Nebraska Act, the Dred Scott decision and the a priori en-
dorsements thereof by both Presidents.
38. Id. at 260.
39. See 2 Beveridge, Abraham Lincoln c. 7 (1928) ; Swisher, op. cit.
supra note 36, c. 24; and 3 Warren, The Supreme Court in United States His-
tory c. 26, 27 (1923).
40. Scott v. Emerson, 15 Mo. 413 (1852).
41. Dred Scott Collection, Missouri Historical Society, St. Louis, Mo.
42. 3 Warren, op. cit. supra note 39, at 5.
43. New York Tribune, Feb. 28, 1856.
1953]
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judges being of opinion that it is not necessary to do so. (This is
confidential) .44 On May 12 on the motion of justice Nelson the
case was put down for reargument. Mr. Greeley thereupon assailed
the "black gowns" as "artful dodgers. The minority were prepared
to meet the issue boldly and distinctly; but the controlling members
were not quite ready for such an encounter of authority as could
be produced; or perhaps not inclined to open the opportunity for a
demolition of the fraudulent pretenses that have been set up in
Congress on this question." 45
Greeley, of course, was fishing in troubled waters and wanted at
the very least what he had every reason to believe would be a
strongly, pro-Republican opinion from Justice McLean for use in
the presidential campaign of 1856. Justice McLean's ambitions for
the presidency are, and were at the time, well known. Foiled in his
apparent design to make immediate political capital via the Dred
Scott case, McLean wrote "a long and thoroughly political letter-
the letter of a candidate," 46 publicly indicating his views on the con-
stitutionality of the Missouri Compromise.- "It was because of this
statement of Justice McLean and of the eagerness and expectation
of the Republican press and leaders that the Supreme Court would
pass upon the Missouri Compromise in its decision in the Dred
Scott case, that Lincoln had said in the Fremont campaign [the
Galena speech, quoted above] that that tribunal was the one to
settle such questions, that when it did so, the Republicans would
abide by what the Court held to be the law and Lincoln had chal-
lenged the Democrats to do the same. If they would not, 'who are
the disunionists, you or we?' "48
After the presidential campaign was safely out of the way the
case was reargued in December, 1856. Two months later, on
February 15, Justice Nelson was directed to write the Court's
opinion ignoring the constitutional issue entirely and turning the
decision on the ground that regardless of Scott's status when he
was in free territory he was, according to Missouri law, a slave
when he voluntarily returned to Missouri and therefore could
not come into a federal court on diversity of citizenship grounds.4
But within a few days it became clear that Justices McLean and
Curtis intended to give extended dissenting opinions emphasizing
44. Curtis, The Life and Writings of Benjamin Robbins Curtis, LL.D.
180 (1879).
45. New York Tribune, May 15, 1856.
46. 2 Beveridge, op. cit. supra note 39, at 461.
47. New York Tribune, June 16, 1856.
48. 2 Beveridge, op. cit. supra note 39, at 461-462.
49. 3 Warren, op. cit. supra note 39, at 15.
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the constitutionality of the Missouri Compromise.5" According to
Justice Catron, this "forced" a majority of his brethren to take
up that issue, and upon the motion of Justice Wayne the Chief
Justice undertook to write his fateful opinion for the Court.51 Some-
thing of Justice Wayne's motives and the motives of those who
concurred in his motion, is seen in his observation that "[t] he case
involves . . . constitutional principles of the highest importance,
about which there had become such a difference of opinion that the
peace and harmony of the country required the settlement of them
by judicial decision. -5 2 As ex-Justice Campbell and Mr. Justice
Nelson put it almost fifteen years later "[t]he apprehension had
been expressed by others of the Court [as well as Justice Wayne],
that the Court would not fulfill public expectation or discharge its
duties by maintaining silence upon these [constitutional] ques-
t io n s . .. .. ,,5 3
In the presidential campaign of 1860 Lincoln and Douglas held
the positions they had taken in their famous Illinois debates in
1858-the one bitterly rejecting the Dred Scott decision, the other
supporting it. Breckinridge, nominee of the Southern wing of the
Democratic Party, also endorsing the famous decision, demanded its
implementation by a Congressional "slave code" for the terri-
tories."4 This was the South's answer to the Douglas Freeport
Doctrine. Clay and Douglas had held the nation and the Democratic
Party together by a compromise that removed the most vexing
problem of the day from the political to the judicial arena. This
entailed an understanding that, win or lose, each claimant would
accept the judicial settlement when it should finally come. But the
North proved unwilling to do so. The Republicans, notwithstand-
ing Lincoln's Galena pledge, repudiated the Dred Scott decision
outright," The Northern Democrats, following the "little giant,"
attempted escape by a legal quibble-the Dred Scott case, they held,
ruled only upon the question of Congressional power over slavery.
Their platform pledged them to await and accept a Supreme Court
decision on the power of the territorial legislatures.5" Upon the
50. Ibid.
51. Id. at 16.
52. Scott v. Sandford, 19 How. 393, 454-455 (U.S. 1857).
53. Quoted in Tyler, Memoir of Roger Brooke Taney, LL.D. 384-385
(1872).
54. 1 Morrison and Commager, op. cit. supra note 5, at 636-638.
55. Ibid.
56. Douglas spells out the constitutional theories behind this position
in The Dividing Line Between Federal and Local Authority, Popular Sove-
rcignty in the Territories, 19 Harper's New Monthly Magazine 519 (1859).
His main point is that the territorial legislative power is not derivative but
independent of, and broader than, Congressional power in respect to slavery.
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issues so joined Lincoln received 1,866,452 votes, as against a com-
bined total of 2,226,738 for Douglas and Breckinridge. Lincoln's
party obtained only a minority in each house of Congress.5 7 This
could hardly be called a popular repudiation of the principle of
judicial settlement or indeed of the Dred Scott decision itself.
Shortly after the election, on the eve of Secession, Senator
Crittinden, Clay's successor in the Senate as fate would have it,
proposed a settlement which would have written an extended
Missouri Compromise into the Constitution. He could not even get
it through a Senate Committee!-s That approach to the slavery
problem had not been politically feasible since the impasse of 1846-
1850. Resort to war between the states followed not, as some would
have it, because political settlement had been foreclosed by judicial
action,5" but more likely because the issues cut too deeply to be
solved either by courts or legislatures. The real misfortune of the
Dred Scott decision was that, duly distorted, it served as a powerful
weapon for the Abolitionists-always a small, fianatical minority.
The Court's fault, if it may be so described, lay in accepting the buck
which Congress and the statesmen had passed, and in failing to an-
ticipate the partisan, political use which its efforts could be made
to serve.
57. 1 Morrison and Commager, op. cit. supra note 5, at 637-639.
58. Hicks, A Short History of American Democracy 363 (1943).
59. See, for example, Jackson, The Struggle for Judicial Supremacy 327
(1941).
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